

ER - F-1

171-6080

June 30, 1959

Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary
The White House

Dear Andy:

I enclose a copy of a memorandum which Hadley Cantril left with me some days ago which contains some interesting ideas on which we are working here. I know that he sees you from time to time, and ~~at his suggestion~~ I told him that I would pass this to you after we had had a chance to study it.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Encls.

AWD:at

Distribution:

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

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Executive

11-51

Objective: To try to reduce somewhat the freedom Soviet leaders now have in negotiation in part because of the ignorance of the Soviet people (including the élite and Party workers) of the destructive power of nuclear weapons; to try to create a pressure from Soviet public opinion that would force Soviet leaders to make compromises in negotiations with the West.

Background: Surprising as it may seem, the evidence appears to indicate that the Soviet people (including most of the élite and most Party members) are not now aware of the destructive potentialities of nuclear weapons.

(This state of affairs in a totalitarian country is obviously deliberate, relieving Soviet leaders on this score from pressures to reach compromises, agreements, etc.)

- Information about Soviet nuclear weapons (as well as information about nuclear weapons and tests in the West) is kept relatively secret. The "mushroom" symbol, so familiar to Americans, would probably be meaningless to most Soviet people.
- There are no pictures of atomic explosions (either Soviet or otherwise) in the Soviet press, or magazines, including the army journal Red Star. (The potentialities of nuclear destruction apparently do not even get into Soviet science fiction.)
- People in the Soviet Union (notoriously eager for peace) tend to think of another World War in terms of the last World War which they so vividly recall.
- An informal survey of approximately 500 Soviet citizens made by a Polish student during 1956 showed that people thought another World War would last between one and five years when they were asked to estimate the duration of another war if it ever came.
- The boasts and threats of Khrushchev about Soviet atomic weapons wiping out different areas are often not reported in the Soviet press or are considerably moderated.
- Since Khrushchev appears to sense that he should be a dictator who is liked as well as respected if he is to keep the élite strongly behind him in carrying out his programs, a greater awareness of the destructive possibilities of nuclear warfare on the part of the more educated and developed people might be built into some pressure from them that Khrushchev would at least have to take into account.
- Also, since Soviet leaders appear to be almost more sensitive to public opinion in satellite areas than do the leaders in satellite countries, the spread of information about nuclear potentials in satellite areas would also be useful.

What might be done.

(Precautionary notes: (1) Obviously any implication of a threat by the U.S. must be scrupulously avoided, and (2) any statement that might make our Allies or neutral nations more jittery must be avoided.)

- When the Vice President goes to Moscow, a carefully planned statement by him (if possible on any TV speech he may be invited to give) could

describe the present situation for the Soviet people - indicating as dramatically (but coolly) as possible:

- the destructive power of a hydrogen bomb - especially comparing it to the bombings of World War II which Soviet people will remember.
 - the mutual danger to both the Soviet and American people - i.e. the number of bombs that could neutralize either nation. (In this connection, Soviet scientists could be complimented on their achievements, the point could be made that science knows no national boundaries, etc.)
 - the urgency of reaching an effective, durable solution.
 - the widespread knowledge American men, women, and children have of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons; the articles and pictures in our newspapers, magazines, books, etc.
 - the great concern of the American people about the situation today and their deep and widespread desire for peace.
- U. S. Congressmen and top-ranking government officials who may be visiting the Soviet Union during the summer might be briefed on this point so that it could become a uniform theme song in statements they may make.
- President Eisenhower might make a statement along the lines indicated above on some occasion chosen or created to maximize the difficulty the Soviet government would have in keeping the President's statement from the Soviet people.
- Use of other methods to circulate the information wherever possible both within the Soviet Union and satellite countries. Use of pictures and statistics, of vivid illustrations and comparisons. (Information available in satellite areas would doubtless have some effect in the USSR as it filtered through.)

If this emphasis makes sense, there should be repetition and more repetition in every possible form to drive the idea home.

If the idea has merit it should, of course, be set into operation well before any possible summit meeting.